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The judicial method of dispute resolution has aroused in Africa countless turnarounds 
of positions, from rejection to acceptance, from construction to destruction, to allow its 
transformation. It seems to have recently stabilized in the figure of the African Court 
of Justice and Human Rights, merging the two existing regional judicial bodies. It is 
already known to us that the two Tribunals have two main pre-defined functions, one 
that deals with the resolution of conflicts between States of the continent and the other 
on the protection of human rights, which are quite different roles. So, in this article, we 
analyze all impediments of the judicial system of African human rights to answer the 
question of whether it is best for African human rights to keep the tribunals separate, 
regardless of the desire to reduce costs or merger is better to ensure more effectively the 
protection of human rights?
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Introduction
the international spread of human rights mechanisms is part of the construction 
of a “new world order of Human Rights,”1 whose procedures and norms are put to 
competition by judicial actors. the regional African system of promotion and 
protection of the rights of peoples has been developed for thirty years. the African 
Charter of the rights of human and peoples’ becomes a central instrument of the 
system which reflects the will of modern Africa “postindependence”2 to include 
human rights in a proactive approach in the jurisdictions which have political 
and social action. indeed it was adopted on 27 June 1981 in Nairobi.3 From this 
instrument, including adoption marks an important step in the progression of 
the African path in terms of the rights of people, the system enriched, thanks to 
economic developments and the salience of some issues, a more dense body of 
standards and institutions with varied, political, administrative or technical skills. 
in General, we can see that if registered mutations were guided by the concern to 
a specific positioning of Africa, they have not always conducted orientation clearly 
defined upstream. the tension between the universal and the African values appears 
as one of the structural features of construction of the system.4
in June 1998 the OAu embraced the Protocol to the African Charter on human 
and Peoples’ rights on the establishment of the African Court on human and Peoples’ 
rights. the African human rights Court is proposed to supplement the African 
Commission on human and Peoples’ rights, the body that has practiced mainland 
oversight over human rights since 1987. the Protocol recommends that the African 
1  As Joseph raz said, “when talking of the emerging world order i have in mind the pattern of institutions, 
treaties and established practices that are emerging under the impact of the economic, social and 
cultural pressures in a world growing smaller and more interdependent through vastly enhanced 
communication technology. the new world order is in the making. we are in a period of fast changes 
in many aspects of the international situation, changes whose directions are uncertain. i would not 
venture to predict, or to recommend a blueprint for, a desirable outcome. My modest aim is to point 
to some possibilities and difficulties inherent in some of the current trends regarding the role of 
individual rights. But even that presupposes a certain awareness and understanding of those trends, 
for there is no possibility of sensible recommendations based on a priori considerations only. they 
must relate to the reality for which they are intended.” See Joseph raz, Human Rights in the Emerging 
World Order, 1(1) transnational Legal theory 31, 39 (2010).
2  human rights as a legal concept were late to arrive in Africa. its evolution on this continent is to be 
seen against the background of the dynamic development of human rights within the united Nations 
system and that of international law, although the impetus of this evolution is owed to the struggles 
within African states in the colonial and post-independence eras. Anton Bösl & Joseph diescho, 
Human Rights in Africa: Legal Perspectives on Their Protection and Promotion 3 (windhoek: Macmillan 
education Namibia, 2009).
3  hermine kembo & takam Gatsing, Le système africain de protection des droits de l’homme: Un système 
en quête de cohérence 11 (yaoundé: L’harmattan, 2014).
4  Id.
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human rights Court will make the advancement and the insurance of human rights 
in the provincial framework more successful.5
As a history, we have to return to the two highlights that preceded the creation 
of the African Court of human rights. this is first of the resolution AhG/res. 230 
(XXX), according to which the Assembly of heads of state and Government, met in 
June 1994 in tunis (tunisia), and expressed its support for the strengthening of the 
Commission and the establishment of the Court6 as “the beginning of real human rights 
enforcement.”7 Later in 2000, the Constitutive Act of the African union was adopted at 
the Lomé (togo) summit. And it was not ratified until July 2001 in Lusaka (Zambia) that 
40 of the heads of state have ratified the transformation of the Organization of African 
unity into the African union.8 the act, at the same time, creates the Court of Justice 
of the African union (however, the Court is not operating). the status, composition 
and functions of this new court are clarified by the Maputo (Mozambique) protocol, 
adopted on 10 July 2003 and ratified by only 5 states at the time.
At the 3rd ordinary session of the Assembly of heads of state and Government 
of the African union (Au) held in July 2004, a resolution on the headquarters of the 
Au bodies was adopted. the most notable decision was the merger of the African 
Court of human rights and the Court of Justice into one court, which is “the African 
Court of Justice and human rights.”9 the main argument advanced in favor of this 
merger was the lack of funding and staff to discuss both courses separately. Moreover, 
one of the reasons for the merger of the African Court of human rights and the 
Court of Justice was the concern to avoid the situation at which the european human 
rights system was confronted at one time. indeed, the jurisprudence of the european 
Court of human rights and the european Court of Justice have at one time emerged 
simultaneously giving rise to two independent corpuses of jurisprudence. the merger 
would prevent them from working in opposite directions, one encroaching on the 
other’s jurisdiction. the main reason for merging is the desire of the African union to 
establish an effective regional court with the necessary resources to defend the rule 
of law, human dignity and human rights.
5  Makau Mutua, The Construction of the African Human Rights System: Prospects and Pitfalls in Realizing 
Human Rights: Moving from Inspiration to Impact 143–144 (s. Power & G. Allison (eds.), New york: st. 
Martin’s Press, 2000).
6  resolution on the African Commission on human and Peoples’ rights, AhG/res.230 (XXX) (1994).
7  simon Zschirnt, Locking In Human Rights in Africa: Analyzing State Accession to the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, 19(1) human rights review 97 (2018).
8  Olufemi Babarinde, The EU as a Model for the African Union: The Limits of Imitation, 7(2) Jean Monnet/
robert schuman Paper series 3, 4 (2007).
9  Abdou dangabo Moussa, Chronique de la Cour africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples à la Cour 
de Justice de l’Union africaine: Histoire d’une coexistence pacifique en attendant la fusion, 76(1) revue 
internationale de droit pénal 135, 137 (2005); Olufemi elias, Introductory Note to the Protocol on the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 48 i.L.M. 314, 334 (2009).
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A totally new creature uncommon under the steady gaze of in international law 
is developing in Africa. the African Court of Justice and human rights (ACJhr) (in 
this after alluded to as the Merged Court) will likewise have a criminal chamber to try 
international crimes. the command of the court will be tripartite and this article tries 
to analyze this most recent aspect; the presentation of a global criminal chamber.10
1. The Inertia of the African Court of Justice
1.1. The Grounds for Establishment
the establishment of the Court of Justice of the African union is part of the 
phenomenon of the multiplication of international, regional and specialized 
jurisdictions, undertaken during the second decade of the last century. the 
jurisdictionalization has always emerged as a crucial step on the road to 
institutionalization. it has been centuries since human societies experienced 
this salutary evolution with the disappearance of private justice and the gradual 
emergence of the first judicial institutions. in the context of interstate relations, as 
governed by public international law, the establishment of a permanent international 
court is recent; characteristic phenomenon of the 20th century, it appears to be 
related to the first attempts at structured organization of international society, by 
which it is understood, by reference to the idealistic and generous impulses that 
almost always follow wars and then dream of building a new world dedicated to 
the peace and happiness of human beings.11
After the First world war, it was naturally at the universal level that the first 
experience of jurisdictionalization was attempted, while at the same time the first truly 
international organization was created. established in 1920 pursuant to Article 14 of 
the League of Nations Covenant to which it was thus attached but of which it did not 
formally belong, the Permanent Court of international Justice (PCiJ) was to mark a first 
milestone on the path of institutionalization of international society. two years later, 
in his inaugural speech, his first President affirmed “the advent of a new era in world 
civilization,” thereby sacrificing the optimism of the time and the somewhat mythical 
ideal of peace by law: the jurisdictional settlement of disputes must then guarantee 
the progress of the international society by preventing the escalation of conflicts.12
in contemporary times, the prohibition of using force in international relations 
implies the obligation to resolve conflicts by peaceful means, of which there are two 
main categories of methods of settlement, depending on whether they are non-
10  harrison Mbori Otieno, The Merged African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJ&HR) as a Better 
Criminal Justice System than the ICC: Are We Finding African Solution to African Problems or Creating 
African Problems Without Solutions? (May 4, 2019), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2445344.
11  Natalie ros, La Cour internationale de Justice comme instrument de la paix par le droit, 25(2) Études 
internationales 273 (1994).
12  Id. at 274.
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jurisdictional. Only international justice is likely to lead to a legal solution imposed 
on the states in dispute, but it is always optional, be it arbitral or judicial, which could 
be sufficient to explain the minor role that the international Court of Justice (iCJ) is 
ultimately called upon to play in the international society.13 in this regard, it is noted 
that in comparison with other continents with international or regional jurisdictions, the 
Pan-African Organization has failed to establish a viable jurisdictional forum and only 
19 African states currently recognized the mandatory jurisdiction of the iCJ. the rest of 
the African states, which is also the majority, are reluctant to resort to the iCJ in settling 
their differences. this reluctance can be explained by the fact that some states do not 
want to be subjected to rules whose development they have not contributed to.14
hence, learning from recent history the consequences of situations of conflict 
between states wars and rebellions has emerged the need to resort to a jurisdictional 
body to resolve these conflicts that annihilate development efforts. the advent of the 
African union justified the establishment of an institution to interpret and punish 
the non-application of the Constitution, treaties and decisions of the union.15 in this 
context, the creation of the Court of Justice represents a substantial step forward, 
since the Member states of the former OAu experienced great difficulty in settling 
their disputes before an international court, preferring a settlement by consensus or 
mediation policy.
1.2. Mission Not Accomplished
the point of departure is that the African Court of Justice is not a specialized 
human rights institution, either in terms of its mandate, jurisdiction, procedures, 
or personnel. the African union Constitutive Act established this Court to be as one 
of the Au’s principal organs. the Protocol of the Court was adopted in July 2003 and 
entered into force in February 2009; 30 days after 15 Member states had ratified it. 
in August 2016, only 44 Member states had signed the 2003 Protocol and 16 had 
ratified it. however, the Court did not begin to function.16
it is worth mentioning that the African union Court of Justice has two advisory 
and contentious powers. in practicing its advisory jurisdiction, the Court may provide 
an advisory opinion on any legal matter, at request of the Assembly, the Parliament, 
the executive Council, the Peace and security Council, the economic, eCOsOCC, 
any of the financial institutions, a regional economic Community or such other 
organs of the union as may authorized by the Assembly.17 in the exercise of its 
13 ros 1994, at 275.
14  Grégoire Bakandeja wa Mpungu, La Cour de justice de l’union africaine: un organe intégré pour la 
consolidation de l’Etat de droit et la promotion des droits humains, Centre for human rights, Pretoria 
university Conference (2008).
15  Id.
16  African Union Handbook 2018 108 (Addis Ababa: African union Commission and New Zealand Crown, 
2018).
17  Art. 44.1 of the Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African union.
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contentious jurisdiction, the Court has jurisdiction to hear disputes and petitions 
submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the Constitution, 
interpretation, application or validity of treaties of the union, for any question related 
to international law and all acts, decisions, regulations and directives of the organs 
of the union. its jurisdiction extends also to bilateral and multilateral agreements 
concluded between the states themselves or with the union, and decides on the 
nature and extent of the due compensation for breaching a commitment. in addition, 
the Assembly may confer to assume jurisdiction on the Court to hear disputes other 
than those previously referred to.18
the jurisdiction of the Court over “any question relating to international law” 
marks the willingness of African states to settle their own inter-state disputes, 
which enables them to contribute to the development of international law by 
participating in its elaboration. thus, the African union complies with international 
standards in enumerating the sources of the law applicable by the Court, while at 
the same time making adjustments to the provisions that no longer have any place 
today.19 however, the Court of Justice does not have erga omnes jurisdiction, since 
its jurisdiction is limited to those states which have accepted its jurisdiction. indeed, 
Article 18.3 of the Protocol provides:
the states which are not members of the union shall not be allowed to 
submit cases to the Court. the Court shall have no jurisdiction to deal with 
a dispute involving a Member state that has not ratified this Protocol.20
18 Art. 19.1 of the Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African union.
19  According to Article 20 of the Protocol, in addition to the Constitutive Act and the “secondary law” of the 
African union, the Court of Justice applies the same sources of law in the settlement of disputes referred 
to it. the iCJ: international treaties, international custom, general principles of law, judicial decisions and 
the doctrine of publicists. the drafters of the Protocol thus seem to crystallize the hierarchy of norms of 
international law that appeared to be operative in Article 38 of the statute of the iCJ. however, the idea 
that Article 38 of the statute establishes a hierarchy of norms is not really validated and this provision is 
considered by publicists as incomplete and partly obsolete. the Protocol brings just two new features. On 
the first hand, the enumeration made by Article 38 does not take into account certain sources of law that 
have developed since 1945: the law of international organizations and the unilateral act of Member states, for 
example. in this respect, the Protocol of the Court of Justice breaks new ground by including in the hierarchy 
“the regulations, the directives and the decisions of the union as auxiliary means of determining the rules 
of law,” corresponding to the potential development of law of the Pan-African Community. On the other 
hand, the notion of terminology today is questionable. this expression is obsolete in an international system, 
moreover u.N., which recognizes the sovereign equality of states and should be rectified. in this regard, the 
African union is taking the first step, reformulating the said provision as follows: “General principles of law 
recognized universally or by African states.” the term “civilized nations” is removed, universalism is proclaimed, 
and the position of African states and Africa is valued in the construction of international law.
20  this brings us back to the role of state consent in the implementation of international law. this consent is 
traditional with respect to the intervention of the judge. however, some states have long been traditionally 
opposed to such intervention and other processes still limit this possible intervention (exception of 
incompetence, reservations, iCJ, spain/Canada case). See Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction 
of the Court, Judgment, i.C.J. reports 1998, p. 432.
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with regard to states Parties to the Protocol, the judgments shall be binding.21
As for the interpretation and application of the Act, the decisions of the Court 
are binding on the Member states and the organs of the union and are taken by 
a qualified majority of at least two votes and in the presence of at least nine judges.22 
Other decisions of the Court and, in particular, advisory opinions, are taken by 
a majority of the judges present and, in the event of a tie, the presiding judge has 
a casting vote.23
states Parties to the Protocol must abide by the judgments of the Court and 
enforce them within a time limit fixed by the Court;24 in the event of non-execution, 
the Court may, at the request of either party, refer the matter to the Assembly, which 
may impose sanctions under Article 23.2 of the Act.25 thus, the Court interprets 
and ensures the application of the African union treaties, secondary legislation, 
international law, and renders binding judgments. in case of the non-execution by 
which the state in question is likely to be brought before the Court, the Assembly 
may impose sanctions.
2. The African Court on Human Rights  
as a Judicial Protector Is Better Than Nothing
2.1. The African Court as a Mechanism to Fill the Judicial Gap
For many years, the African human rights system has been structured around 
the African Commission on human and Peoples’ rights, which was then the only 
African institution (not a judicial body) responsible for the protection of human 
rights. But less than two decades after the activation of the African Commission, this 
uni-institutional landscape will be disrupted by the entry into force on 25 January 
2004 of the Protocol to the African Charter on human and Peoples’ rights creating 
the African Court on human and Peoples’ rights.26
the human rights system in Africa is long embodied by the African Commission 
has been the subject of much criticism resulting from its status as a quasi-judicial 
body. the last laudatory terms did not fail to indicate the powerlessness of the African 
Commission to fulfill its mission of protecting and promoting human rights. in this 
21  Art. 37 of the Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African union.
22  Id. Art. 38.
23  Id. Art. 34.
24  Id. Art. 51.
25  Id. Art. 52.
26  samir s.Z. yerima, La Cour et la Commission africaines des droits de l’homme et des peuples: noces 
constructives ou cohabitation ombrageuse?, 1(1) African human rights yearbook 357, 358 (2017); 
N. Barney Pityana, Reflections on the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 4(1) African human 
rights Law Journal 121, 122 (2004).
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context, the Conference of heads of state and Government at its 34th session held 
in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) from 8 to 10 June 1998; approved the Protocol of 
establishing the Court. Finally, the Protocol will enter into force on six years later 
along with depositing the instrument of ratification by the Comoros.27
the system placed by the Protocol is resolutely aimed at remedying the shortcomings 
of the Charter. wherefore, the establishment of the African Court is a necessary stage 
to establish a consistent and effective system for the protection of human rights in 
Africa. this new step reinforces and complements the existing structure of the African 
Charter and the original body “the African Commission on human and Peoples’ rights” 
for monitoring respect for the rights guaranteed by them.
the creation of a coherent African system for the protection of human rights 
responds to a broader international movements for elaborating the regional systems 
so as to protect the human rights initiated by adopting the Convention for the 
Protection of human rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 195028 followed by 
the european Court of human rights29 and the entry into force of the American 
Convention on human rights, in 1969 created the inter-American Court of human 
rights,30 while the delay in establishing the African system corresponds mainly to 
the political environment of the 1960s and 1970s marked by some leaders more 
concerned with brandishing the principle of national sovereignty to hide human 
rights violations committed in their country than to build a supra national system 
27  yerima 2017, at 359.
28  On 4 November 1950, the Convention for the Protection of human rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
was signed in rome. developed within the Council of europe, its purpose is to define a number of 
fundamental rights and to establish a control and sanction mechanism to ensure that the signatory 
states respect these rights. Guaranteed rights are defined by the Convention itself, supplemented by 
Additional Protocols. For more details, see Martin Janku, Universal and Regional Conventions for Human 
Rights Protection: Co-Existence And/Or Confrontation in Dny práva – 2010 – Days of Law (r. dávid et al. 
(eds.), Brno: Masaryk university, 2010) (May 4, 2019), available at https://www.law.muni.cz/sborniky/
dny_prava_2010/files/prispevky/11_evropa/Janku_Martin_(1826).pdf.
29  established on 21 January 1959, it is responsible for upholding the fundamental rights enshrined 
in the european Convention on human rights, adopted on 1950 by the Council of europe, which 
defines the rights and freedoms that Member states commit to guarantee their citizens. it is composed 
of a number of judges equal to that of the states that have ratified the Convention (currently 47). 
Anyone who claims to be a victim of a violation by a state of the provisions of the Convention may 
lodge a complaint with the Court.
30  developed by the inter-American Commission on human rights, the American Convention on human 
rights (AChr) was adopted on 1969 by the Organization of American states (OAs) and entered into 
force in 1978. with the exception of Canada, from Cuba and some Caribbean states, most states in 
the Americas have signed the AChr. the united states signed it in 1977 but has not ratified it yet. 
so far (November 2011), 24 states have ratified the Convention. trinidad and tobago withdrew its 
membership in 1998. the AChr not only defends the rights of its own citizens, but also of every 
person within the jurisdiction of a signatory state. in addition to containing human rights guarantees, 
the AChr provides the foundation for the inter-American Court of human rights and defines the 
activities and powers of the Court as well as the inter-American Commission on human rights. these 
two organs of the OAs are responsible for the application of the AChr. For more details, see katrin 
Nyman-Metcalf & ioannis Papageorgiou, Why Should We Obey You?: Enhancing Implementation of 
Rulings by Regional Courts, 1 African human rights yearbook 167, 177 (2017).
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for the protection of human rights. But this delay is going to be bridged by the 
adoption of African instruments for the protection of human rights and the bodies 
responsible for ensuring respect of human rights.
According to Article 3.1 of the Protocol,
the jurisdiction of the Court shall extends to all cases and disputes 
submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the Charter, 
this Protocol and any other relevant human rights instruments ratified by 
the states concerned.
this formula, which opens a field of indefinite jurisdiction, is inspired by the 
model of the inter-American Court of human rights, whereas more conventionally 
the jurisdiction of the european Court only covers the Convention and its Protocols. 
similarly, the Court clearly gives the applicants the status of “party’s choice.”31 
this quality, thus, allows any applicant, in particular a non-state applicant to be 
represented by right directly before the Court by the legal counsel of his choice. 
Further, legal representation or assistance may be provided free of charge in cases 
where the interests of justice so require.32
within this framework, the African Court exercises its contentious function vis-à-
vis the states Parties recognizing its jurisdiction. in accordance with the provisions 
of Articles 5.3 and 34.6 of the Protocol, the Court may also receive applications from 
the African Commission, individuals and non-governmental organizations against 
such states. there is no doubt that this is a significant development of African human 
rights law. undoubtedly, in international law, the recognition of fundamental rights 
to individuals and peoples has not originally been accompanied by the legal capacity 
to apply in cases of violation. the consecration of a right of direct or indirect access of 
private persons (individuals and non-governmental organizations) in the courtroom 
of the African Court, which is in the overall wake of the recognition of these persons 
as subjects of international law, is therefore a real juridico-institutional revolution.33
in conjunction with this contentious function, the African Court has an advisory 
function under the provisions of Article 4 of the Protocol and Article 68 of its rules of 
Procedure. requests for opinions are at the initiative of the Member states, the African 
union, however, any African union organ or African organization are recognized by 
the union.34
31  Art. 10.2 of the Protocol to the African Charter on human and Peoples’ rights.
32  Jean-Louis Atangana Amougou, Avancées et limites du système africain de protection des droits de 
l’homme: la naissance de la Cour africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples, 3 droits fondamentaux 
175, 176 (2003).
33  télesphore Ondo, La jurisprudence de la Cour africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples: entre 
particularisme et universalité, 1 African human rights yearbook 244, 246 (2017).
34  Id. at 247.
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in carrying out its mission, the Court defines the different actors in this perspective; 
it guarantees direct confrontation between the alleged victims of human rights 
violations and the respondent states, while respecting the adversarial principle 
recognizes the rights of victims to participate in the trial and compensation for the 
damage caused to them; and guarantees the equality of arms between the parties 
throughout the proceedings before the Court, and respecting the requirements of 
a fair trial. in so doing, the Court interprets, irrigates, develops and enriches African 
human rights law.35
For the better protection of human rights, the African Court has the greatest 
freedom since it may order “appropriate orders to remedy the violation, including 
the payment of fair compensation or reparation,”36 one of these possibilities being 
the payment of a compensatory allowance or compensation. the obligation to give 
reasons for the Court’s judgments is also fundamental to both the doctrine and the 
parties. Furthermore, even if the decisions are taken by a majority, the judges will 
have the possibility to add their individual or dissenting opinion. the members of 
the Commission did not have such freehand.37
to avoid any risk of confidentiality as well, another criticism often made against 
the Commission, “the judgment of the Court shall be read in open court, due notice 
must be given to the parties.”38
Finally, the states Parties undertake to execute the judgments of the African 
Court, the follow-up of the execution thereof assigned to the Council of Ministers 
of the African union. this solution, more realistic than the one previously adopted 
by the Charter 7, is closer to that of the procedure in force in the european system, 
where the execution of judgments rendered by the Court is entrusted to the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of europe. however, beyond this technical 
density that we observe in the new African system, there are still some limits that 
could be detrimental to its action.39
2.2. The Complementary Relationship with the African Commission
together the African Court on human and Peoples’ rights with the African 
Commission on human and Peoples’ rights, constitute the African system for the 
protection of human rights. within this framework she performs her duties vis-à-vis 
states Parties and may receive requests from the African Commission, individuals 
and A-governmental organizations against states having accepted jurisdiction.
35 Ondo 2017, at 247.
36  Art. 27.1 of the Protocol to the African Charter on human and Peoples’ rights.
37  Nyman-Metcalf & Papageorgiou 2017, at 176.
38  Art. 28.5 of the Protocol to the African Charter on human and Peoples’ rights. See Nyman-Metcalf & 
Papageorgiou 2017, at 177.
39  Arts. 29 and 30 of the Protocol.
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First of all, the cohabitation of numerous institutions found to protect and 
defend human rights requires a relationship among the institutions concerned. 
the principle that controls this relationship is the “principle of complementarity.” 
Considering firstly the overlapping jurisdictions of the Commission and the Court, also 
the substantial function the Commission could perform as a party before the Court, 
a proper understanding of the significance of the principle, as principle of interaction, 
becomes fundamental.40 And it is worth mentioning that complementarity is indicated 
in the preamble to the Protocol as well as in Articles 2 and 8. Article 2 provides that 
the Court should complement the protective mandate of the Commission, whereas 
the Preamble mentions the reinforcement of its efforts under its protective mandate. 
Article 8 provides that:
rules of Procedure of the Court shall lay down the detailed conditions 
under which the Court shall consider cases brought before it, bearing in mind 
the complementarity between the Commission and the Court.41
the complementary relationship through fruitful cooperation between the 
African Court and the African Commission has been shaped by the many successes 
that are usually achieved by both entities in terms of the protection of human rights. 
Further, recognizing the fact that the isolation can in many cases generate a danger 
for both entities, they have decided to eliminate the distance. this took the form of 
joint sessions and consultation sessions. thus, the rules of Procedure of the African 
Commission on human and Peoples’ rights states that it
shall meet with the Court at least once a year and, if necessary, to ensure 
good working relations between the two institutions.42
the bet of the consecration of the principle of complementarity was to put an 
end to the sluggishness of the system and to resolutely return with the efficiency for 
a greater credibility. thus, the main objective of the complementarity is functional; 
its purpose is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the system. today, 
remarkable progress has been made and testifies to the productive nature of the 
relationship between the African Court and Commission. this progress is palpable 
especially in terms of their protection mandate.43
40  Annika rudman, The Commission as a Party Before the Court – Reflections on the Complementarity 
Arrangement, 19 Potchefstroom electronic Law Journal 1, 3 (2016).
41  Id.
42  Art. 115.1 of the rules of Procedure of the African Commission on human and Peoples’ rights; see 
also yerima 2017, at 373.
43  yerima 2017, at 376.
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the human rights mandate has certainly been one of the best achievements and 
one of the greatest beneficiaries of cooperation. the complementarity between the 
African Court and the Commission has already resulted in the protection of human 
rights in concrete cases. it is thus with the competence of referral to the African Court 
by the African Commission that this last paragraph of Article 5 of the Protocol.44
As far as, the advisory opinions are concerned, everything seems to indicate 
the success of the harmonization of the internal regulations of the two institutions. 
indeed, the fear of entanglement or divergence related to the competing jurisdiction 
of the African Court and Commission in advisory matters remained in the hypothetical 
state. the African Court has accommodated itself to its advisory role by ensuring 
respect for the principle of complementarity. Notably through the respect of Article 
68(3) of its rules of Procedure and Article 4(1) of the Protocol which forbid him to 
intervene on matters whose subject is related to a case pending before the African 
Commission. to date, it has demonstrated a strict application of this precept.45
the appeal by the African Court with the jurisprudence of the African Commission 
is also one of the most significant marks of trust between the two entities. the high 
44  the African Commission was thus party to the African Court in already two finalized cases. the first is the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya case. 
in this dispute, the African Commission by an application dated 3 March 2011 has in accordance with 
Article 118(3) of its rules of Procedure brought an action against the Great socialist People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya alleging serious and massive violations of human rights. irrespective of the “unsuccessful” 
outcome of this procedure, the African Commission through this petition truly concretized this aspect 
of the complementary relations between it and the African Court. See African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights v. Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, App. No. 004/2011, Order on Merits 
of the Application, 15 March 2013; see also Joseph M. isanga, The Constitutive Act of the African Union, 
African Courts and the Protection of Human Rights: New Dispensation?, 11(2) santa Clara Journal of 
international Law 267, 287–288 (2013); Judy Oder, The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ 
Order in Respect of the Situation in Libya: A Watershed in the Regional Protection of Human Rights?, 11(2) 
African human rights Law Journal 495, 497 (2011). the second case to which the African Commission 
was a party is even more symptomatic of the positive application of complementarity. this is the African 
Commission v. Libya case. in connection with this dispute, the African Commission, by an application 
dated 28 February 2013, lodged an appeal against the Libyan state on behalf of dr. saif al-islam Gaddafi 
alleging “violation of the rights” of the latter by the Libya. this case which led to the condemnation of 
the Libyan state glorifies the principle of complementarity in two ways. Firstly, it is a simple observation 
of the effectiveness of the constructive relationship between the two institutions through the use 
by the African Commission of its right of referral. Complementarity is also revealed because of the 
individual origin of the referral made by the African Commission. this request is, therefore, the sign 
not only of the vitality of the principle of complementarity, but also the proof of the rationality and 
the applicability of the parade to the limitation of the right of direct access of individuals to the African 
Court. See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Libya, App. No. 002/2013, Order on Merits 
of the Application, 15 March 2013.
45  For example, in the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP), where the Court states 
that “By letter dated 9 March 2012, the registrar enquired from the African Commission whether 
or not the subject-matter of the request is related to any matter pending before the Commission. 
By letter dated 7 June 2012, the Commission informed the registrar that the subject matter is not 
related to any matter before it.” See Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP), request 
No. 001/2012, 15 March 2013.
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Court does not hesitate to rely on the jurisprudence of the African Commission to 
support analyze and provide solutions.46
the fate of the complementarity between the African Court and the Commission 
is closely linked to the African system of human rights as a whole. the success of 
complementarity is assuredly a guarantee of the effectiveness of the system which 
itself a condition for the success of complementarity.47
2.3. The Winds Do Not Blow as the Vessels Wish: Some Criticisms
it is better than nothing, but unfortunately, “Man does not attain all his heart’s 
desires.” the Court has been criticized for its effectiveness.
2.3.1. Insufficient Rate of Ratification of the Protocol to the African Charter
ratification is an essential stage towards achieving the objectives of treaties by 
states parties. Although it is axiomatic, the question remains: why should states 
ratify conventions? this question is linked to the fundamental objective of the partial 
subject matter, namely the examination of the practice of the states members of 
the African union with regard to ratification of the conventions of the Organization, 
particularly, the Protocol to the African Charter. in fact, within this limited literature, 
most research focused on state behavior and motivation is based on ratification 
and compliance with, human rights conventions.48 it can be demonstrated that 
by ratifying the treaty under certain circumstances and motives, the state itself 
attaches to many other states that may equally wish to adopt human rights norms. 
there may be a motive for other countries to strengthen their legitimacy, reputation 
and respect among their peers or even in the broader international community by 
adopting standards by ratifying the treaty in question and avoiding stigmatization 
of exclusion as a non-ratified state.49 however, we find to date, only 30 Au Member 
states have ratified the Protocol. it should be noted that, by comparison, 54 Au 
Member states have already ratified the Charter.50 we cannot say for sure the reasons. 
46  in the matter of limitation of rights for legitimate interest, the African Court spontaneously convenes 
the Communications of the African Commission in the Mtikila v. United Republic of Tanzania case. the 
African Court relies on the proportionality measurement technique used by the African Commission 
to assess the impact, nature and extent of the limitation in relation to the legitimate interest of the 
state for certain purposes. See Tanganyika Law Society and Legal and Human Rights Centre and Reverend 
Christopher R. Mtikila v. United Republic of Tanzania, App. Nos. 009&011/2011, Order on Merits of the 
Application, 14 June 2013.
47  yerima 2017, at 378.
48  tiyanjana Maluwa, Ratification of African Union Treaties by Member States: Law, Policy and Practice, 13(2) 
Melbourne Journal of international Law 1, 9 (2012).
49  Id. at 11.
50  the Protocol was signed in June 1998 and, thirty days after the required fifteenth ratifications by 
the union of the Comoros on 26 december 2003, it entered into force on 25 January 2004. to date, 
the Ouagadougou Protocol has been ratified by 30 Au Member states (Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, 
RUSSIAN LAw JOURNAL     Volume VII (2019) Issue 2 178
they can be for some conceptual. indeed, the African conception of human rights has 
a specificity that is rooted in cultural and traditional values. the Charter itself recalls 
in its preamble that it takes into account “the virtues of their historical tradition and 
the values of African civilization which should inspire and characterize their reflection 
on the concept of human and peoples’ rights.”51
thus, the Charter, in its conception, militates in favor of a settlement of disputes 
concerning human rights through “the institution of the palaver tree.” the latter 
is nothing other than the African preference for the non-jurisdictional settlement 
of disputes, which favors methods of amicable settlement through dialogue and 
consultation. it must be recognized fundamentally that, from the sociological point 
of view, the African citizen prefers conciliation to the judicial decision with a punitive 
connotation. the concept of recourse to the Court is hardly acceptable; when you 
attack an act, the perpetrator considers itself personally targeted. Considering that 
the Charter has not in itself provided for the establishment of a legal system for 
the protection of human rights. it preferred to entrust this task to a commission 
by demanding that it endeavors by all appropriate means to reach an amicable 
solution. this conception at the origin of the Charter certainly explains its massive 
ratification, states not being too afraid of their sovereignty. however, the advent of 
the Ouagadougou Protocol will transform this conception and translate the idea of 
a real institutionalized justice. Although it provides for the possibility of amicable 
settlement, the activity of the Court is purely judicial. this difference in the design 
of the Charter and the Protocol is certainly one of the reasons explaining the states’ 
infatuation with the ratification of the first and the cautiousness with regard to the 
ratification of the second.52
the low ratification rate of the Protocol can also be explained by limited 
institutional capacity in some states. it is clear that states are aware of the institutional 
failures of their judicial system or of their system of protection of human rights in 
general, which ipso facto will be condemned by the African Court, if the state in 
question recognizes the competence by ratifying the Protocol. For many, ratification 
would mean facing an automatic condemnation of the African Court whenever the 
Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’ivoire, Comoros, Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, kenya, Libya, 
Lesotho, Mali, Malawi, Mozambique, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nigeria, Niger, rwanda, sahrawi Arab 
democratic republic, south Africa, senegal, tanzania, togo, tunisia and uganda). Abraham Liyew, 
Taking a Case to the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights: Procedural Challenges and the Court’s 
Role in Addressing Them, Master’s thesis, Norwegian Centre for human rights (2006), at 11–13; Morris 
kiwinda Mbondenyi, Investigating the Challenges in Enforcing International Human Rights Law in Africa: 
Towards an Effective Regional System, thesis, university of south Africa (2008), at 32; see also Frans 
viljoen, A Human Rights Court for Africa, and Africans, 30(1) Brooklyn Journal of international Law 1 
(2004); Nsongurua J. udombana, Toward the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better Late 
Than Never, 3(1) yale human rights and development Law Journal 45, 99 (2000).
51  Abdou-khadre diop, La Cour africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples ou le miroir stendhalien du 
système africain de protection des droits de l’homme, 55(2) Les Cahiers de droit 529, 545 (2014).
52  Id. at 545–546.
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state in question was attacked before it. thus, some prefer to make the necessary 
reforms to adapt to international standards, before recognizing the jurisdiction of 
the African Court.53
2.3.2. The Dilemma of the Execution of the Provisions of the African Court
international regional courts face various challenges. the execution of their 
judgments is one of the most difficult, because the control mechanisms are often 
powerless and unsuitable. As a general rule, regional human rights conventions 
provide member countries with a broad initiative for the execution of these judgments. 
in addition to the absence of punitive provisions sanctioning any deficiency in case 
of non-performance, the control is in turn devolved to bodies rather political than 
judicial.
it seems in practice that African countries prefer other solutions over judicial 
solutions, and are not bound by judicial decisions even in cases where such states 
have theoretically accepted such obligations. Not only because of the fear of being 
punished, although this danger plays a role, either directly or indirectly. Cultural 
norms and beliefs also play a role, where most jurists assume that it is more important 
than such sanctions. states continue to tend to implement their international 
obligations voluntarily, with no interference from any on the basis of the principles 
of international law, especially, the principles of sovereignty. As well, one question 
for obeying or disobeying rules is the legitimacy of the body that issues decision 
that determines the propensity to act in accordance with it. the issue is political and 
not practical. if there is political will, methods will be found to enforce the decisions. 
states join a society to achieve certain goals and for this purpose renounce part of 
their sovereignty. in the scope of protection of human rights, which are no longer 
exclusively internal, states are under the influence of many factors that accept such 
commitments and, to the extent possible, seek to implement them, especially if they 
do not conflict with the various interests of the state concerned.54
On the one hand, international human rights conventions, on the other hand, 
seem to have assumed in states parties the implementation of their obligations in 
good faith in accordance with the provisions of international law, granting states 
full freedom to implement their obligations.55 under Article 30 of the Protocol to 
53 diop 2014, at 546.
54  Nyman-Metcalf & Papageorgiou 2017, at 183.
55  with regard to international law, Article 26 of the 1969 vienna Convention states: “every treaty in force 
is binding upon the parties and must be performed by them in good faith.” this principle also implies 
that states parties to a treaty cannot avail themselves of obstacles posed by their domestic legal order 
to avoid the fulfillment of their international obligations. Article 27 of the vienna Convention states 
that “a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform 
a treaty.” See Gonzalo sánchez de tagle, The Objective International Responsibility of States in the Inter-
American Human Rights System, 7(2) Mexican Law review 115, 121–122 (2015).
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the African Charter, states Parties undertake to comply with the provisions of the 
Court and to ensure their implementation in any case to which it is a party within 
the period determined by the Court. this is not easy, but requires taking into account 
the circumstances of each state Party concerned with the judgments of the Court 
and its capacity and willingness to implement those provisions. Nevertheless, the 
good faith of the states can in no way be regarded as a guarantee of the execution 
of the decisions of the Court.
the Protocol does not depart from what is customary in the field of monitoring 
the implementation of the provisions of the international human rights by regional 
courts. the task of supervising the implementation of these provisions is usually 
entrusted to political bodies established not even within the framework of human 
rights conventions, but within the framework of the conventions under which they 
were concluded, such as the Committee of Ministers within the framework of the 
Council of europe and the executive Council within the framework of the African 
union, which negatively affects its work in this area. experience has shown that such 
devices are rarely subject to political pressures as different in Africa, especially, if 
we know that the executive Council of the African union shall assume this function 
on behalf of the Conference of African heads of state and Government only, as 
provided for in the Protocol and rules of Procedure of the Court, which shall entrust 
the oversight of the implementation of the judgments of the Court to the executive 
Council. Pursuant to Article 29.2 of the Protocol, this Council shall be notified of the 
provisions of the Court to monitor its implementation on behalf of the Conference, 
but with the exception of indicating the time or duration required to implement 
the provisions, neither the Protocol nor the rules of Procedure of the Court shall be 
specified nor indicate how such to the powers of the executive Board in this area 
even in cases where the states concerned do not take action to implement the 
sentences or originally refused. But in principle it can be said that it will follow the 
general procedures provided for in the Constitutive Act of the African union and 
the bylaws of the executive Board, where it will monitor implementation through 
the inclusion of provisions on its agenda and discuss them during its meetings that 
are held twice a year or even at its extraordinary session.56
One of the most important problems in the effective implementation of the 
provisions of international human rights law – including those of international 
human rights courts – is the lack of effective means of implementation within the 
territories of states where human rights are violated, especially since the protection 
mechanisms adopted so far – international and individual reports and complaints – 
remains ineffective in the absence of an effective sanctions regime and the absence 
of international provisions governing sanctions that may result from non-compliance 
56  rachel Murray et al., Monitoring Implementation of the Decisions and Judgments of the African Commission 
and Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1(1) African human rights yearbook 150, 158, 160 (2017).
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or rather human rights violations, so that international bodies in charge of protection 
cannot take any legal action. the security Council, for example, can adjust these 
violations in a manner that is a threat to international peace and security. the 
international sanctions imposed on states for the purpose of protecting human rights, 
whether they are social, economic, political or even armed, is a work based on Chapter 
vii of the Charter of the united Nations and implemented by the highest political 
organ – the security Council – has failed to carry out such tasks in some countries of 
the African continent, and the sanctions imposed on rhodesia and south Africa, but 
the results were then successive concessions from the white minority for the benefit 
of the black majority, which was finally able to achieve independence.57
however, previous considerations have not prevented human rights workers from 
trying to find as many different ways of protecting human rights and in applying even 
the slightest sanctions against human rights violators. there are many international 
sanctions that they can sign in this scope, such as the suspension of economic aids, 
freezing of funds, the refusal of states to join some international organizations and 
the provision of conditional assistance to respect human rights. there are even those 
who stress the importance of publishing and defaming issues related to human 
rights violations, the aim of which is to show these violations to public opinion of 
the forms of punishment, where the public opinion is really a powerful pressure 
force may lead to the reversal of such violations. the Protocol does not depart from 
this trend. the failure to implement the Court’s decisions is to include cases of non-
implementation in the annual report of the Court. this latter is obliged, in accordance 
with Article 31 of the Protocol, to submit to each ordinary session of the Assembly of 
heads of state and Government a report containing the work and activities carried 
out during the year in particular in all cases where states have not complied with the 
provisions of the Court, contrary to the Charter, which requires the prior approval 
57  the security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 253 (1968) on southern rhodesia 
was, on the other hand, a subsidiary organ of the Council under rule 28 of the Provisional rules of 
Procedure of southern rhodesia. its composition was initially limited to seven members but was soon 
enlarged to include all members of the Council. the Committee functioned from 28 October 1968 to 
21 december 1979, and during this period it examined the implementing measures, drafted twelve 
annual reports and a number of special reports for the Council, made recommendations on various 
aspects of implementation, were informed of several hundred violations reported by governments (in 
particular the united kingdom) and non-governmental organizations and examined the detailed analyzes 
made by the secretariat on the effects of sanctions on economy of southern rhodesia. u.N. security 
Council, security Council resolution 253 (1968) [southern rhodesia], 29 May 1968, s/res/253.
with regard to south Africa, the Commission on south Africa was established by resolution 421 (1977) 
as a subsidiary organ of the security Council and considered reports on the national implementation of 
the arms embargo under resolution 418 (1977). the essence of its work is the study of communications, 
which is done in particular. u.N. security Council, security Council resolution 418 (1977) [south Africa], 
4 November 1977, s/res/418. See Martti koskenniemi, Le Comité des sanctions créé par la Résolution 
661 (1990) du Conseil de Sécurité, 37 Annuaire français de droit international 119, 121–122 (1991); 
Mariano J. Aznar‐Gómez, A Decade of Human Rights Protection by the UN Security Council: A Sketch of 
Deregulation?, 13(1) european Journal of international Law 223, 225 (2002).
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of the Assembly of African heads of state and Government, to publish the reports 
of the African Commission human and peoples.58
with reference to Article 13 of the Constitutive Act of the African union, we 
conclude that, in the absence of enforcement, the Assembly may impose the 
appropriate sanctions of an economic nature such as depriving the state of transport 
links or contacts with other states or suspending economic ties or sanctions of 
a political nature such as severing diplomatic relations or even suspension of 
membership or expulsion from the African union, which will make this country in 
isolation from the rest of the other countries.59 Nonetheless, we cannot be assured 
of the role played by the Assembly as one of the principal political organs affected 
by the political considerations that guide its discussions and decisions, which 
may weaken its role in monitoring the implementation of the provisions of the 
Convention and the ineffectiveness of its decisions against states that refuse to 
implement the decisions of the African Court. On the other hand, since suspension 
of the membership of the Contracting Party or even expulsion from the Organization 
final does not achieve the desired goals, especially if there is a continuation of cases 
of violation and the unresolved issues outstanding in the field of human rights.
3. The Merger Court: Advantages and Impediments
3.1. Convergence and Divergence
the question of the merger between the two courts had been debated for the 
first time in Mauritius, in April 2003, at the meeting of Ministers of Justice which had 
been organized in order to draw up the draft Protocol of the Court of Justice of the 
African union. this discussion was based on the work of the Group of Legal experts 
and the Committee of Permanent representatives, which highlighted the need to 
streamline the two courts, to reduce the costs of their operation and the existence 
of two courts with similar skills that could lead to conflicting competencies and 
contradictory judgments. verily, the scope of the Court of Justice’s mandate could 
create interference with the African Court of human rights. Articles 3(h) and 4(m) 
of the Constitution establishing the objective and the principle of protection and 
respect for human rights, the Court of Justice could rule on the inapplicability of 
these by a Member state. this duality of jurisdiction could pose difficulties including 
different interpretations and judgments on the same point of law.60
58  Fatsah Ouguergouz, La Cour africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples – Gros plan sur le premier organe 
judiciaire africain à vocation continentale, 52 Annuaire Français de droit international 213, 225 (2006).
59  Max du Plessis & Christopher Gevers, Balancing Competing Obligations: The Rome Statute and AU 
Decisions, institute for security studies Paper 225 (October 2011), at 1, 13 (May 4, 2019), available at 
https://www.africaportal.org/documents/6805/Paper225.pdf; Ben kioko, The Right of Intervention 
Under the African Union’s Constitutive Act: From Non-Interference to Non-Intervention, 85(852) 
international review of the red Cross 807, 807–808 (2003).
60  Bakandeja wa Mpungu 2008, at 13.
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despite the opinions expressed by some legal experts and members of the 
Permanent representatives Committee, the meeting finally decided that the two 
courts should be separated. On the recommendation of the Conference of Ministers, 
the executive Council, followed by the Assembly, decided in July 2003 that the African 
Court on human and Peoples’ rights would be maintained as a separate institution 
and separated from the African union Court of Justice.61 Among the objections raised 
against the merger, some delegations had mentioned, first of all, the difference in 
jurisdictional mandates between the two Courts. Of course, the African Court on 
human and Peoples’ rights was created to complement the African Commission, 
particularly in the scope of human rights protection, while the Court of Justice is 
a broader jurisdiction whose jurisdiction extends to all Au treaties and conventions 
as well as to all matters concerning international law. some defenders expressed 
fear that the merger of the two courts would compromise the African Court’s human 
rights mandate. On the other hand, some delegations pointed out that an outright 
merger of the two Courts would require the drafting of a new protocol and a new 
commitment by African states to submit to this jurisdiction. Further, the merger could 
also delay the establishment of the African Court of human rights since the Court of 
Justice had not obtained the number of ratifications sufficient to its creation.62
despite objections to the proposed merger, the Assembly finally decided that 
the African Court on human rights and the Court of Justice should be merged 
into a single Court and asked the President of the Commission to elaborate the 
modalities for the implementation of his decision in a report to be submitted to it at 
its next session. in addition, in July 2005, at the sirte summit, the Assembly mandated 
Mr. Mohammed Bedjaoui, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria and former President 
of the iCJ, to prepare a draft legal instrument on the implementation in headquarter 
of the Court resulting from that merger.63
the draft legal instrument was made and amended by the Algiers working Group 
of Jurists from Member states, meeting in Algiers (Algeria) from 21 to 24 November 
2005, taking into account observations and comments made by Member states. By 
a decision of the executive Council of 24–28 January 2005,64 the draft legal instrument 
and the recommendations of the Commission and the Committee of Permanent 
representatives relating thereto were referred to a meeting of the Permanent 
representatives Committee and governmental legal experts for finalization and 
presentation to the 7th ordinary session of the executive Board. however, following 
61  decision on the draft Protocol of the Court of Justice, eC dec 59 (iii), 4–8 July 2003; decision on the 
draft Protocol of the Court of Justice, A dec 25 (ii), 8 July 2003.
62  Bakandeja wa Mpungu 2008, at 13.
63  decision on the Merger of the African Court on human and Peoples’ rights and the Court of Justice 
of the African union, Assembly/Au/dec.83 (v), 4–5 July 2005.
64  Nsongurua J. udombana, Eying the Promised Land: The Wearisome Quest for an Effective Regional Human 
Rights Enforcement Mechanism in Africa, 1(1) transnational human rights review 179, 190 (2014).
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the meeting of the Committee of Permanent representatives and Legal experts 
from 16 to 19 May 2006, many doubts have remained about the relevance of certain 
provisions of the “draft Protocol on the statute of the African Court of Justice and 
human rights.” the contentious issues were then referred for consideration to the 
executive Council which decided to entrust the examination of the legal instruments 
to a meeting of the Ministers of Justice in order to finalize them and to report to the 
next ordinary session of the Council in January 2007.65
in fact, the slowness of the negotiations on the institutional merger was partly 
due to a divergence of views on the formal aspects of the integration of the two 
courts. undoubtedly, three options were at the heart of the discussions. the first 
was to adopt a new Protocol establishing a single Court which would consist of the 
main elements contained in the Protocol of the African Court and in the Protocol 
of the Court of Justice. the new Protocol was to replace the existing Protocols, but 
it would have the disadvantage of delaying the creation of the new Court, since 
the Protocol of the African Court of human rights had already entered into force. 
however, this option would have the advantage of animating negotiations on the 
opening of the referral of the African Court to individuals and non-governmental 
organizations. the second option was to maintain the Protocols of the African Court 
of human rights and the Court of Justice and to adopt a third amended Protocol 
which would regulate the merger of the two Courts and which would invite states to 
be parties to the three instruments. this option had the advantage of requesting only 
the signature of the states Parties to the two previous Protocols, for the entry into 
force of the amended Protocol. Finally, a third option, considered complementary, 
was to create, as a matter of urgency, the African Court of human rights through the 
adoption by the Conference of decisions on the terms of office of judges, the seat 
of the Court, the budget.66 At the end, on the recommendation of the Committee of 
Permanent representatives, the first option was retained by the executive Board, in 
addition to the third, by which it designated the eleven judges of the African Court 
of human and Peoples’ rights.67
3.2. Granting a Variety of Skills
the jurisdiction of the Court extends to all cases and disputes of a legal nature 
that are submitted to it and which have as their object all the areas set out in the 
Protocol relating to the Court of Justice, to which are added the interpretation and 
the application of the African Charter on human and Peoples’ rights, the African 
Charter on the rights and welfare of the Child, the Protocol to the African Charter 
65 udombana 2014, at 191–192.
66  Bakandeja wa Mpungu 2008, at 13.
67  decision on the election of Judges of the African Court on human and Peoples’ rights, eX.CL/dec.261 
(viii), 4–8 July 2003.
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on human and Peoples’ rights on the rights of women or any other human rights 
instrument to which the states concerned are parties.68
it seems that the statute of the new Court could improve the jurisdiction of the 
African system for the protection of human rights through current discussions 
on the extension of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court to new entities and 
especially to individuals. indeed, under Article 31 of the statute of the African Court 
of Justice and human rights, the following entities could have standing to refer 
to the Court any violation of human rights: states parties to Protocol, the African 
Commission on human and Peoples’ rights, the African Committee of experts on 
the rights and welfare of the Child, the African intergovernmental organizations 
accredited to the union, the national human rights, natural persons and NGOs 
accredited to the union or its organs. this extension of the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the Court would thus make the African system for the protection of human 
rights a progressive system, like the european system which recognizes the right 
of individual petition and makes it mandatory for all Contracting Parties. the drafters 
drew their inspiration from the practice followed by the security Council, of which 
a considerable number of its resolutions are addressed, not only by united Nations 
Member states, but by a plurality of non-state entities. the non-state recipients of 
security Council resolutions are entities or actors that include, among others, inter-
governmental organizations, rebel movements and individuals – individuals and 
private legal entities.69
3.3. “Killing More Birds with One Stone”: The Multi Advantages Criminal 
Jurisdiction
the merger has resulted in the creation of three sections: the General Affairs 
section, the human and Peoples’ rights section and the international Criminal 
section. the first section is responsible, on the one hand, for disputes between 
African states and, on the other hand, of the Legal department of the African union 
with its staff. the second section is a regional court of human rights. the third 
section is one that is established by the Protocol in Malabo. under the terms of 
Article 28A of the Malabo Protocol, according to international Criminal section, it is 
competent ratione materiae to deal with fourteen international crimes: genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crime, crime related to the change unconstitutional 
change of Government, piracy, terrorism, mercenary activities, corruption, money 
laundering, trafficking in persons, illicit trafficking of drugs, illegal traffic of hazardous 
wastes, illicit exploitation of natural resources and the crime of aggression. the 
enumeration of these crimes is not exhaustive. Article 28.2 provides that the list of 
68  Art. 28 of the Protocol on the statute of the African Court of Justice and human rights.
69  udombana 2014, at 201–202.
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the above-mentioned crimes may be updated in the light of the development of 
international law.70
the quest for a regional court competent with respect to international crimes 
which have been politically motivated by the conflicts that have arisen, on the one 
hand, between the African union and the international Criminal Court about its 
focus on Africa and, on the other hand, between the African union and the european 
union, on the misuse of universal jurisdiction by the courts some of the Member 
states of this organization with respect to Africans in general, and of their leaders, 
especially.71
Article 4(h) of the Au Constitutive Act provides in fact,
the right of the union to intervene in a Member state pursuant to 
a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.
More, Article 4(o) affirmed, inter alia, to reject impunity. thus, in the legal view, we 
can say that the constitutive Act of the Au provides an implicit traditional basis for the 
establishment of an African criminal court in which the international criminal division 
is embodied. Although these articles do not provide for a strict legal obligation to 
establish a court, they demonstrate the African union’s acceptance that it has an 
obligation to prevent the punishment of international crimes.72
the advantage of the new Court is its permanence which allows overcoming the 
long process that characterized the implementation of hybrid courts. the permanent 
70  stefaan smis & ezéchiel Amani Cirimwami, Repenser la création fragmentée des jurisdictions hybrides 
en Afrique au profit de la Cour africaine de justice, des droits de l’homme et des peoples, 1 revue belge 
de droit international 314, 321 (2017); Matiangai sirleaf, The African Justice Cascade and the Malabo 
Protocol, 11(1) international Journal of transitional Justice 71 (2017).
71  while not excluding the possibility that the Al Bashir case, for example, has exacerbated the desire of 
Africa to pursue international crimes, it considers that it is misleading to conclude that on this episode 
that is the basis for the search for the international Criminal Court in Africa. According to him, the 
possibility of establishing a regional Criminal Court had already been attempted – before later – be 
rejected during the drafting of the African Charter of the rights of man and of peoples in the early 
1970s, mainly as a mechanism to fight against the regime of apartheid in south Africa which the u.N. 
General Assembly had in 1966 labelled a crime against humanity, a determination affirmed by the 
security Council in 1984. See Ademola Abass, Historical and Political Background to the Malabo Protocol 
in The African Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Malabo Protocol 15–16 (G. werle & M. vormbaum 
(eds.), the hague: Asser Press, 2017); kelly Lekkerkerker, The African Quest for an Inter-African Jurisdiction: 
Looking Beyond the International Criminal Court Versus African Debate, Master’s thesis, Leiden university 
(2017), at 4; Ademola Abass, The Proposed International Criminal Jurisdiction for the African Court: Some 
Problematical Aspects, 60(1) Netherlands international Law review 27, 49–50 (2013); smis & Amani 
Cirimwami 2017, at 322.
72  On the basis of the same provisions, the African union established the Committee of eminent African 
Jurists to reflect on the prosecution mechanisms of hissène habré, in particular recommended that 
the African Court extend its jurisdiction to Criminal cases to ensure that Africa can act in a timely and 
massive human rights violations. Abass 2017, at 16–17; smis & Amani Cirimwami 2017, at 322.
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nature could meet the urgent and imperative necessity to achieve human justice 
at the time of the victims or, at the very least, reduce the gap between the two. to 
some extent, the merged Court could be a bulwark in situations where lack of will 
policy to establish a hybrid Court, or in situations where local actors are opposed to 
the creation of such a court. this is the only condition that the goals of transitional 
justice, including, to bring to justice those responsible for serious violations or bring 
justice and dignity to victims could be achieved.73 Another advantage is skill. the 
regionalization of international criminal law also makes it possible to extend the 
catalogue of crimes for which the merged Court, in its international Criminal section, 
will exercise its jurisdiction, while preserving the four main crimes of international 
law: war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and the crime of aggression. 
this provides a definite advantage relating to the jurisdiction ratione materiae which 
brings back in its material field almost all situations where the quest for justice would 
call for creating a new internationalized or hybrid criminal jurisdiction in Africa.74
Among the new regional crimes, it should highlight the crime related to the 
unconstitutional change of Government. the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court 
with respect to this crime is particularly interesting.75
Actually, the jurisdiction ratione personae is advantageous – in some ways – in 
that the Protocol in Malabo provides for the criminal liability of companies. this is 
still an important innovation in the field of criminal justice international. to date, 
international criminal courts are hardly interested in the question of the criminal 
liability of legal persons. Articles 9 and 10 of the international military tribunal 
statute allowed it to declare criminal any group or organization to which the accused 
belonged, in consequence of which others could be prosecuted for their adherence 
to this group or organization. in cases tried by the Court and later proceedings in 
respect of Act No. 10 of the board of control, a number of organizations have thus 
73  For example, the victims of the crimes of habré from 1982–1990 witnessed the creation and the 
operationally of the extraordinary African chambers within the senegalese courts (eAC) between 
2012 and 2013. it is same for the victims of the atrocities committed since 2003 in the car which, to 
date, expect that the special Criminal Court in Central African republic (sCC) actually begins its work. 
is that – to quote the judge of the iCJ Antônio trindade – time of victims do not seemed has not be 
human justice in both hybrid courts. human justice thus ran, taking often more time than a human 
life. smis & Amani Cirimwami 2017, at 324–325.
74  Id. at 325.
75  it is worth mentioning that the circumstances which led to the creation of eAC and the sCC have for 
origin of the facts that could be described as “unconstitutional change of Government.” indeed, on 
7 June 1982, hissène habré and the Forces armies of the North, a rebel movement led by him, 
overthrew the Government of union national transient headed by Goukouni weddeye and took the 
direction of Chad. it is from this reign that the crimes of which he was accused were committed. rather, 
it is the coup of 2003 François Bozizé challenged by Michel djotodia which marked the beginning of 
several civil wars in the car, before the violent rise to power in 2013 of the rebels of the seleka and 
the escalation of violence that had ensued between ex-séléka and anti-Balaka. however, it appears 
from the statutes of the CAe and the C.P.s. this crime of unconstitutional change of Government is 
not the jurisdiction of these courts. Id. at 326.
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been designated as criminals, but in the end, only physical people have been tried 
and punished.76
the complementarity between the merged Court and the national courts is also 
a major asset. the Malabo Protocol enshrines the principle of complementarity, 
whereby the new Court intervenes when the state party concerned cannot, and 
will not prosecute international crimes committed on its territory, thus leaving the 
priority for the national court at the same time; Article 46h of the Malabo Protocol 
introduced a new order of jurisdiction: the course of regional communities. this 
article provides that
the jurisdiction of the Court shall be complementary to that of the 
National Courts, and to the Courts of the regional economic Communities 
where specifically provided for by the Communities.
this is an incentive to the domestic courts and sub-regional to develop their 
own capacity to pursue and deal with serious crimes. the implementation of this 
complementarity allows us to participate in the national systems and sub-regional 
systems, to strengthen in order to better provide for the suppression of all crimes 
for Court is competent.77
3.4. Some Challenges
As mentioned above, the African Court of Justice has not been operating to date. 
it was born dead out of the womb of the African union, therefore we cannot assess 
its role or even criticize it. As for the African Court of human rights, it has faced some 
criticisms concerning the question about its effectiveness, which makes us inquire 
about the ability of the merged Court to avoid the same criticisms.
3.4.1. The Defy Related to Ratification
the Protocol shall be open for signature, ratification or accession by Member states 
of the African union in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.78 
For some delegations, the content of the Protocol is not exactly the same as that of 
the two existing Protocols and the new provisions should be re-examined as part 
of the ratification. Other delegations felt that the choice should be given to other 
Member states that had already ratified the two existing Protocols, including the 
76  Neither the t.P.i.y. nor the t.P.i.r. not have been granted jurisdiction over legal persons. however, the 
special chambers responsible for serious crimes committed in east timor, the eAC or the sCC, have not 
been filled. the authors of the rome statute had found that opinions diverge are deeply as to whether to 
include in the statute the criminal responsibility of legal persons and, despite the proposals made in this 
sense, the final text contains no provision on the issue. smis & Amani Cirimwami 2017, at 327–328.
77  Id. at 330.
78  Art. 8.1 of the Protocol on the statute of the African Court of Justice and human rights.
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option to sign only the Protocol, indicating that this would accelerate the entry into 
force of the Protocol and thus the establishment of the organs of the union.79
the Protocol and the statute of the African Court of Justice and human rights shall 
enter into force thirty days after the deposit of the instruments of ratification of fifteen 
Member states.80 One of the problems that are readily apparent is that some states that 
are parties to the human rights Protocol, for whatever reason, do not wish to ratify 
the Protocol, will not have to appear before the new Court.81 Moreover, the number of 
ratifications required for the entry into force of the Protocol has not been completed. 
Only six countries to this day have ratified it.82 we cannot say whether the Protocol 
will achieve a high percentage of ratifications or not. we do not mean the percentage 
required entering into force, but we mean to go beyond the stipulated rate to avoid 
criticism of the weak ratification rate that the African Court of human rights faced.
3.4.2. The Compulsory Implementation of the Judgments of the Merged Court
Admittedly, the implementation of the judgments of the African Court of 
human and Peoples’ rights is essentially voluntary. however, the follow-up of the 
execution of the Court’s judgments is entrusted, in accordance with Article 29.2, to 
the executive Council of ministers and the Court submits to the Assembly, at each 
ordinary session, an annual report of its activities which, in particular, cases where 
a state has failed to comply with the decision of the Court.83 No measure of constraint 
is therefore provided for in the Ouagadougou Protocol to ensure the execution of 
the Court’s judgments. the review of the provisions of the statute Protocol of the 
new Court reveals a significant improvement by extending the provisions on the 
binding force of the judgments of the Court of Justice contained in the 2003 Protocol 
to all judgments of the new Court, including those relating to the violation of human 
rights. indeed, if a party to the dispute does not execute the judgment of the Court, 
the latter may refer the case to the Conference, which may decide on the measures to 
be taken in order to give effect to the decision, including the imposition of sanctions 
under Article 23.2 of the Constitutive Act of the African union.84
79  African union, summary report on the Meeting of the PrC and Legal experts on Legal Matters, PrC-
eXP/LeGAL/rpt, Addis Ababa, ethiopia, 16–19 May 2006 (May 4, 2019), available at http://www.african-
court.org/en/images/Activity%20reports/eXeCutive%20COuNCiL%20Ninth%20Ordinary%20
session.pdf.
80  Art. 9.1 of the Protocol on the statute of the African Court of Justice and human rights; Art. 11.1 of the 
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the statute of the African Court of Justice and human 
rights.
81  udombana 2014, at 193.
82  Benin (28 June 2012), Burkina Faso (23 June 2010), Congo (14 december 2011), Libya (6 May 2009), 
Mali (13 August 2009), Liberia (23 February 2014).
83  Art. 31 of the Protocol to the African Charter on human and Peoples’ rights.
84  Art. 47 of the statute of the African Court of Justice and human rights.
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in a positive sense, the merger would make it possible, on the one hand, to 
reduce the costs related to the functioning of the organs of the African union as well 
as to reduce the risks of conflicts of competence between the jurisdictional organs 
of the union and on the other hand, to introduce into the institutional framework 
of the Constitutive Act of the Au, a section on human rights. in addition, it would 
be likely to improve the African system for the protection of human rights and 
peoples through the possibility of opening the referral to the Court to individuals 
and NGOs and through the extension to the section of human rights of the possibility 
of sanctioning the failure of states to execute judgments of the Court.
Conclusion
it seems that the merged court could increase the effectiveness of the Au’s 
Judicial function in general and the protection of human rights on the African 
continent, in particular, if it has the capacity to receive and deal with individual 
requests and whether the merger carried out ensures a faster and activated African 
jurisdiction, thanks to an economy of material and financial means. thus, the future 
of the Court of Justice of the African union and of the African Court of human 
rights is for the moment uncertain because it is at the heart of national reticence 
concerning the submission of states to the verdict of a regional court and thus 
the question of the abandonment of certain elements of sovereignty in favor of 
a supranational structure.
it is not a secret that the execution of judicial decisions at the state level is not 
always guaranteed due to numerous inter alia political interferences. At the level of 
a jurisdictional body such as the Au Court of Justice, this issue will be very acute, 
especially if human rights violators are heads of state in office and even outgoing 
heads of state.
Africa plagued by wars and other repetitive political convulsions as the internal 
wars or rebellions, inter-state wars masked by supporters of rebel movements, 
insurgent movements against established powers, which cause many damage and 
massive violations of human rights, needed a jurisdiction to track down all human 
rights violators. the heads of state of the Au have understood this by deciding to 
establish the Court of Justice of the African union. it will be merged with the current 
African Court of human and Peoples’ rights. the continent is thus endowed with an 
important instrument, not only for the protection of human rights but also for the 
administration of an independent Pan-African justice, in the aim of the construction 
of the rule of law and the consolidation of democracy. the objective is to put an end 
to the reign of impunity that has long characterized Africa. it is desirable that this 
merged Court should not be diluted in the African Court of human and Peoples’ 
rights which has only specialized competence and limits on the enforcement of its 
decisions, whereas the new Court of the union has a General competence in the 
interpretation of Community law (right of treaties and secondary law).
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the permanent character of the new Court, in its international Criminal section 
coupled with the other benefits described, presents more advantages for the 
achievement of transitional justice. even more so, if hybrid jurisdictions were 
preferred because they were less costly and operating directly in the conflict-
affected country and with the affected population, the court’s permanence still 
reduces the cost of setting up future jurisdictions and nothing in its statute or in 
the Malabo Protocol precludes it from organizing its roaming procedures or trials 
in either country affected by the crimes.
Finally, we are keen to stress that the legal rule whether not applied or breached 
does not negate its existence and origin as a legal rule that associated with a material 
penalty for whom violates thereof. At the African regional level, especially in the field 
of human rights; there are several regional conventions. the latter will lose much 
of their effectiveness unless there is a real judicial guarantee in case of violation. 
however, the regional courts itself are at risk of losing their effectiveness unless they 
respect the new Court’s judgments. thus, the merger shall not only aim to reduce 
expenses, but the best outcome for human rights is to ensure implementation of 
the judgments of the new Court.
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